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450 ROHE V. STATE BAR. [17 C. (2d) 
pay Miss Monti 75 per cent of the $1300, but that he would 
not do so under compulsion either of the civil action brought 
by her or of the State Bar proceeding. 
In its recommendations the committee expressed its belief 
that Miss Monti had been willing that the petitioner should 
include the three obligations in the negotiations for a settle-
ment of her claim against Mr. Fields, and that he should 
have the benefit thereof without accounting to her, if they 
could be settled for a small amount;· but that the dispute 
arose over the fact that the petitioner did not fully or fairly 
advise her of all steps taken in connection with the settle-
ment of his obligations and that had Miss Monti known that 
as a result of those negotiations he had received more than 
double the original fee agreed upon, she would not have au-
· thorized the liquidation of his obligations in the manner dis-
closed. 
These findings and conclusions, as qualified by the com-
mittee's analysis in its recommendations, are supported by 
the record. This is so even though we consider favorably to 
the petitioner the· collateral matters referred to by him and 
relied JlPon as showing a motive to cast discredit upon him 
by the initiation of proceedings before the State Bar. It is. 
a fact that the events herein were not called to the atten--" 
tion of· the State Bar for nearly a year after their occurrenpe. 
But.it is also a fact that in the meantime Miss Monti had 
brought a civil action against the petitioner. [2] Whatever 
may have been the instigating factor, or whatever may have 
been the personal motive, in the initiation of the State Bar 
proceeding, are not matters of controlling concern in a case 
where the facts disclosed independently lead to the conclu-
· sion that the attorney is subject to some disciplinary action. 
There is ,no showing that any personal motives of individuals 
\havegenerated any pressure or .prejudice or have in any way 
. prevented the petitioner from having full, fair and unbiased 
~earings. However, we are in agreement with the petitioner 
that under all the circumstances disbarment is too harsh 
. discipline, and that the ends to be subserved ·by the proceed-
· in:g herein will be satisfied by a suspension as recommended 
· by the local committee. . 
It is ordered that the petitioner, Clifford A. Rohe, be sus-
pended from the practice of the law in this state for a period 
of three months, beginning thirty days from and after the 
filing of this order • 
Feb. 1941.J PEOPLE V. YOUNG. 451 
[erim. No. 4324. In Bank.-February 20, 1941.J 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. WILLIAM YOUNG, Appel. 
lant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Evidence-Competency and MaterialitY-Con_ 
fessions-Proof of Confession-Absence of Reporter.-A con-
fession of an accused taken down by question and answer 
by a shorthand reporter and transcribed by him may be intro-
duced in evidence, though the reporter was not called as a 
witness, where a POlice officer testified that the defendant read 
the transcribed statement and freely and voluntarily signed it in his presence. 
l2] Id.-Evidence - Competency and Materiality _ Documentary 
Evidence-Proof of Randwriting._The defendant's signature 
to a letter is Sufficiently proved to authorize its intrOduction 
in evidence where an admission of writing it was contained 
in his signed confession introduced in evidence and was also 
testified to by a witness, and where his signature was iden-
tified by a handwriting expert with another letter by him. 
[3] Id.-Argument and Conduct of Counsel-Concluding Argu-
ments-Scope of Argument-Comment upon Defendant.-In 
a prosecution for murder, a reference· by the district attorney 
in his closing argument to the defendant as a "killer" did 
not constitute prejudicial misconduct in the light of evidence 
establishing the crime. 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239), 
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County and from an order denying a new trial. Peirson M. 
Hall, JUdge. Affirmed. 
No appearance for Appellant. 
Earl Warren, Attorney-General, . and· Eugene M. Elson, 
Deputy Attorney-General, for Respondent. 
THE COURT.~Defendant was found guilty of firsf de-
gree murder without recommendation of leniency in the 
Superior Court of Los Angeles County which pronounced 
1. See 8 Cal Jur. 117; 20 Am. Jur. 452; 1 R. C. L. 576. 
McK. Dig. References: 1. Criminal Law, § 475; 2. Criminal 
Law, § 517 j 3. Criminal Law, § 629. 
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452 PEoPLE V. YOUNG. [17 C. (2d) 
the death sentence and denied a motion for a new trial. The 
cause comes before this court on an automatic appeal. 
The evidence establishes the following facts: Defendant, 
twenty-six: years old and unmarried, was in love with Ruth 
Lugo, a twenty-nine year old Mexican woman who had been 
twice married and had four children. Her refusal to marry 
him and her plea that they stop seeing each other led the 
defendant to brooding which culminated in his determination 
to kill her and himself. To that end he stole a gun, purchased 
cartridges and wrote a letter outlining his plan to be given 
to his mother. On June 10, 1940, he called on Ruth Lugo 
and tried to persuade her to marry him. Failing to do so, he 
came over to her chair, sat in her lap, and fired two shots 
through her chest, causing her death. Members of the fam-
ily, residing in the same house and in near-by houses, heard 
the shots and rushed into the room where they found the 
defendant with a gun in his hand near the body of Ruth 
Lugo. The shot which he fired at himself just missed being 
fatal. While he was attempting to shoot himself a second 
time, the members of the family intervened, finally over-
powered him and then delivered him into the custody of the 
police. 
[1] During the course of the trial Police Officer"Lopez'" 
took the stand and testified that shortly after the killing 
he had interviewed the defendant, that the questions and 
answers were taken down by a shorthand reporter under 
his direction, that these shorthand notes were transcribed by 
the reporter, that he had read them shortly after they were 
transcribed and verified them as correct. He was then asked 
to give the questions and answers, but defendant objected 
on the grounds that the shorthand reporter was not present 
to verify the transcribed statement and that no proper foun-
dation had been laid. Lopez did not give the questions and 
answers but testified that the questions and answers con-
tained in the written statement produced in court and shown 
to him were correct according to his present recollection. 
Officer Fremont then testified that defendant subsequently 
had read the statement and freely and voluntarily signed it 
in his presence. The statement contained a full confession 
of the crime by the defendant, and the parts considered rele-
vant and not prejudicial were read to the jury as evidence. 
Regardless of Officer Lopez's testimony which merely iden-
tified the statements contained in the written document as 
Feb. 1941.J PEOPLE V. CRAIG. 453 
those made to him by defendant, Officer Fremont's testimony 
was sufficient to justify the reading of the relevant portions 
thereof to the jury as a confession of the crime. 
[2] The defendant further objected to the introduction 
in evidence of the letter written by him to his mother on the 
ground that there was insufficient proof that the signature 
on the letter was defendant's. Defendant's admission in his 
signed confession that he had written the letter, the testi-
mony by a witness that defendant immediately after the shoot-
ing admitted writing the letter, and the testimony by a hand-
writing expert identifying the signature with that on another 
letter written by the defendant, justify the finding of the 
trial court that the signature had been sufficiently proven to 
permit the introduction of the letter. (Code Civ. Proc., secs. 
1940, 1944.) 
[3] The district attorney's reference to the defendant as 
a "killer" in his closing address to the jury did not con-
stitute prejudicial misconduct justifying a reversal in the 
light of the facts of the case. 
In view of the ample evidence to support the verdict, the 
absence of any errors in the record, and the soundness of the 
instructions given by the trial judge to the jury, the judg-
ment and order of the trial court are affirmed. 
[Crim. No. 4327. In Bank.-February 20, 1941.) 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, V. ARKELL H. CRAIG, Ap-
pellant. 
[1] Criminal Law - Former Jeopardy - Identity of Offenses-
What Constitutes Identity of Offenses-Offenses Against Per-
sons.-Under Pen. Code, sec. 261, only one offense of rape 
results from a single act of sexual intercourse, although that 
act may be accomplished under more than one of the circum-
stances specified in the statute; e. g., where the intercourse 
is had by the use of force, upon a girl under the age of 
consent. 
[2] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses-Introductory_ 
Tests for Determining Identity.-A common test whereby for 
2. See 7 Cal. Jur. 956; 15 Am. Jur. 54; 8 R. C. L. 143. 
MeR. Dig. References: 1. Criminal Law, § 143; 2. Criminal 
Law, § 139; 3. Criminal Law, § 1016; 4. Criminal Law, § 1446. 
